The Politics of Executive Nominations in the Post-Nuclear Senate

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6182829
AutoresIan Ostrander (0000-0001-5248-1780, Michigan State University, autor correspondente)
Ano2017
Volume44
Fascículo3
Páginas323-343
Data de publicação2017-09-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCongress & the Presidency (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0734-3469 • E-ISSN: 1944-1053
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07343469.2017.1354943
OpenAlexW2757404115
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas7
Referências citadas22

In response to an ever more inefficient, intrusive, partisan, and plodding executive nominations process, a variety of increasingly potent reform measures have been recently enacted within Congress. The solutions have ranged from cutting the number of appointments requiring Senate confirmation to reducing the power of the filibuster on most nominations. Although these reforms may speed the nominations process, they may also influence the balance of power between Congress and the presidency by allowing more unilateral and unrestricted appointments. Is Congress conceding confirmation for expediency? In this investigation, I explore recent reforms with respect to the speed and outcomes of the executive nominations process as well as the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches

Balance (ability · Executive branch · Executive power · Law and economics · Legislative process · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidency · Process (computing · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Neuroscience · Psychology · Public Administration