People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6206469 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Corey Cusimano (0000-0002-4980-7839), Geoffrey P Goodwin (0000-0002-3682-0444) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 999-1029 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315 |
| Editora | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/pspa0000198 |
| PMID | 32437185 |
| OpenAlex | W3027738514 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 10 |
| Referências citadas | 64 |
People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Study 1) as well as others who agree with them (Studies 2-5, 7), and it occurs when people judge strangers (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) as well as close others (Studies 3 and 7). It appears not to be explained by impression management or self-enhancement motives (Study 3). Rather, there is a discrepancy between the evidentiary constraints on belief change that people access via introspection, and their default assumptions about the ease of voluntary belief revision. That is, people tend spontaneously to think about the evidence that supports their beliefs, which leads them to judge their beliefs as outside their control. But they apparently fail to generalize this sense of constraint to others, and similarly fail to incorporate it into their generic model of beliefs (Studies 4-7). We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of ideology-based conflict, actor-observer biases, naïve realism, and ongoing debates regarding people's actual capacity to voluntarily change what they believe. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)
Control (management) · Perceived control · Perception · Social approval · Social perception · Turnover · Cultural Differences and Values · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
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Morality justifies motivated reasoning in the folk ethics of belief
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Children and adults' intuitions of what people can believe
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A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
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Responses to Uncontrollable Outcomes
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Temporal differences in trait self-ascription
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How mental systems believe
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Culture and cause
Actor-observer differences in perceptions of effective control
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Implicit theories of emotion
Religion and the morality of mentality
The illusion of control
Feeling and thinking
The Third-Person Effect in Communication
The Mechanics of Motivated Reasoning
The case for motivated reasoning
Culpable control and the psychology of blame
| Obras citantes distintas | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 10 |