Countering Democratic Backsliding by EU Member States

Constitutional Pluralism and ‘Value’ Differentiated Integration

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6222736
AutoresR Bellamy (0000-0002-9823-0626, University College London (UCL), autor correspondente), Sandra Kröger (0000-0002-6069-1064, University of Exeter, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume27
Fascículo3
Páginas619-636
Data de publicação2021-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSwiss Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1424-7755 • E-ISSN: 1662-6370
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/spsr.12448
OpenAlexW3138863346
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas27
Referências citadas35

Constitutional pluralism (CP) and differentiated integration (DI) have been criticised as potentially legitimising democratic backsliding within the EU. Critics contend that effective measures require strengthening the legal authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the political authority of the European Commission. We dispute this criticism, which rests on a federal conception of the EU at odds with its confederal features. We argue that the value of democracy for the EU derives from pluralism between as well as within states, thereby justifying CP and DI. While both prove incompatible with democratic backsliding, they challenge the legitimacy of the strong assertions of federal authority some advocate to tackle it. Drawing on CP, we propose four criteria for EU action against backsliding regimes, and suggest processes and penalties that meet them. We liken the latter to ‘value’ DI, whereby backsliding states can be excluded from EU funding and voting rights

Commission · Criticism · Democracy · democratic deficit · Democratic legitimacy · Economics · European union · International economics · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Systems and Governance