Does Institutional Location Protect from Political Influence? The Case of a Minimum Labour Standards Enforcement Agency in Australia
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6234028 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Glenda Maconachie (Queensland University of Technology), Miles Goodwin (Parliament of Australia) |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 105-119 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Australian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/10361146.2010.544640 |
| OpenAlex | W1991117809 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 13 |
Among the many factors that influence enforcement agencies, this article examines the role of the institutional location (and independence) of agencies, and an incumbent government's ideology. It is argued that institutional location affects the level of political influence on the agency's operations, while government ideology affects its willingness to resource enforcement agencies and approve regulatory activities. Evidence from the agency regulating minimum labour standards in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction (currently the Fair Work Ombudsman) highlights two divergences from the regulatory enforcement literature generally. First, notions of independence from political interference offered by institutional location are more illusory than real and, second, political need motivates political action to a greater extent than political ideology
Agency (philosophy · Business · Economics · Enforcement · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |