Metropolitan Governance in Sydney

A Case of ‘Joint Decision-Making

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6234401
AutoresDaniel Kübler (0000-0001-7373-0926, University of Zurich, autor correspondente)
Ano2007
Volume42
Fascículo4
Páginas631-647
Data de publicação2007-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAustralian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1036-1146 • E-ISSN: 1363-030X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/10361140701595809
OpenAlexW2008755895
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas19

This article analyses metropolitan governance arrangements in contemporary Sydney. Debate about the efficacy of these arrangements typically degenerates into an argument about the pros and cons of institutional consolidation. The article moves beyond this dispute, drawing on the concept of ‘actor-centred institutionalism’ to argue that Sydney's urban sprawl, combined with its rigid institutional setting, has produced what can be described as a ‘joint decision system’ of governance. Effective metropolitan governance in Sydney mainly depends on the ability to reach negotiated agreements within this system. However, a rising level of conflict between the New South Wales State government and local councils located within metropolitan Sydney increases the likeliness of undesirable blockades within the joint decision system. The article concludes that a cautious exercise of new overriding powers by the State government is crucial to promoting more effective metropolitan governance in Sydney. This article is based on field research conducted by the author between December 2004 and April 2005, while staying as a visiting research fellow at the City Futures Research Centre of the Faculty of the Built Environment of the University of New South Wales. Information about the research methodology is given in the Appendix. Acknowledgments During my stay, I have greatly benefited from discussions with Bill Randolph, Patrick Troy and Raymond Bunker. I also thank the two AusJPS referees for their thorough reading and constructive criticism of an earlier draft. Notes This article is based on field research conducted by the author between December 2004 and April 2005, while staying as a visiting research fellow at the City Futures Research Centre of the Faculty of the Built Environment of the University of New South Wales. Information about the research methodology is given in the Appendix. 1The expression ‘metropolitan area’ draws on the concept of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), used by the US Census Bureau to describe functionally integrated urban areas that have sprawled across several institutional boundaries. In Australia, this concept is best represented by the Capital City Statistical Division (SD) category, as defined by the Australian Standard Geographical Classification (ABS Citation2004). Although the exact definition of the Capital City SDs differs slightly across the Australian States and Territories, it represents ‘the city in a wider sense’ (ABS Citation2004, 14), and is delineated on the basis of consultation with planners in order to contain the anticipated area of development of each State's or Territory's main urban region for a longer period. Hence, when I speak of the Sydney metropolitan area in this text, I refer to the Sydney Capital City Statistical Division. 2For an overview of this debate, see Ostrom Citation(1972), Lefèvre Citation(1998), Lowery Citation(1999), Frisken and Norris Citation(2001). 3The introduction of the goods and services tax (GST) in 2000 has sparked a debate on its effects on vertical fiscal imbalance (see Williams Citation2005). Reviewing this debate, Braun Citation(2006) argues that ‘the system of fiscal relations is ... still based on strong vertical fiscal imbalances and dominance of the federal government even if there is less dependence on the willingness of the Commonwealth to supply resources’ (p. 28). He concludes that GST has moved the fiscal relations between the Commonwealth and the States towards the principle of joint decision-making. However, this does not automatically reduce the degree of conflict in these relations. 4In actor-centred institutionalism, ‘welfare’ is always understood in the economists' sense of global societal benefits—and not in the public policy sense of governmental services for the less well off. 5This is the mechanism behind the so-called ‘joint decision trap’ (Scharpf Citation1988), the well-known concept elaborated by actor-centred institutionalism, that describes a situation when a joint decision system is blocked due to the inability of the actors to get beyond the status quo. 6Scharpf (Citation1997, 132) argues that ‘problem solving’ as a mode of reaching agreements under unanimity rules is not at all as idealistic and unrealistic as it may appear in the light of the rational choice literature on negotiations. Indeed, there are many instances of policy-making whereby actors are engaged in negotiation settings in which distributional issues are quite irrelevant—because they were neutralised beforehand. The typical example is joint ventures, ‘which are based on elaborate contracts settling all sorts of distributive issues in advance in order to facilitate uninhibited cooperation in the same form of undertaking’ (Scharpf Citation1997, 253). 7In the language of game theory, Pareto optimality describes solutions to coordination dilemmas that improve the utility of at least one player, without reducing the satisfaction of any other player. Kaldor optimality describes solutions to coordination dilemmas whereby gains to the winners are high enough to permit full compensation to all losers (see Scharpf Citation1997, 90–1). 8This section is based on Spearrit and de Marco Citation(1988), Spearrit Citation(2000), Freestone Citation(2000), O'Neill and McGuirk Citation(2002), McGuirk Citation(2005). 9There is, of course, also a scientific argument against urban consolidation (see, for example, Troy Citation1996). The point here is not the accuracy of the pros and cons of urban consolidation, but simply the observation that there is a profound disagreement between State and local governments on this point. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDaniel Kübler Daniel Kübler is currently Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science of the University of Zurich, Switzerland. His research interests are urban politics and metropolitan governance, as well as social and public health policy

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