The Staying Power of the Legislative Status Quo
Collective Choice in Canada's Parliament after Morgentaler
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6239148 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Thomas Flanagan (University of Calgary, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1997 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 31-53 |
| Data de publicação | 1997-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Canadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s000842390001492x |
| OpenAlex | W1980893269 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 4 |
| Referências citadas | 6 |
Rational choice theory has drawn attention to the phenomenon of structure-induced equilibrium in situations of potential cycling. When there is no majority, first preference or Condorcet winner, the outcome is determined by agenda control and institutional rules of decision making. Within that context, the status quo has a special advantage because of the parliamentary amendment procedure, in which the status quo, as the default option to the bill in formal form, is not voted upon until the last stage. The unsuccessful attempts of the Canadian government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to respond legislatively to the Supreme Court's Morgentaler decision illustrate these general principles of rational choice. The government was unable to get legislation passed because, with cyclical configurations of opinion in both the House of Commons and the Senate, institutional rules, especially the order of voting required by the parliamentary amendment procedure, favoured the status quo
Condorcet method · Context (archaeology · Dilemma · Economics · Government (linguistics · House of Commons · Law and economics · Legislation · Legislature · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Preference · Status quo · Status quo bias · Supreme court · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,15 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1999 - 2014 (16) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 4 |