Distributive Politics in Canada

The Case of Infrastructure Spending in Rural and Suburban Districts

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6239261
AutoresOlivier Jacques (0000-0002-3864-1773, Queen's University), Benjamin Ferland (0000-0002-3856-7809, University of Ottawa)
Ano2021
Volume54
Fascículo1
Páginas96-117
Data de publicação2021-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCanadian Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0008-4239 • E-ISSN: 1744-9324
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0008423920000955
OpenAlexW3123879225
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas38

This article examines the presence of geographically targeted spending in the allocation of infrastructure projects in Canada. Building on formal models of distributive politics, we expect government districts, core government districts and swing districts to be advantaged in terms of infrastructure projects. We also investigate whether characteristics of Members of Parliament (MPs), such as seniority or holding a cabinet position, influence the distribution of infrastructure projects. Empirically, we analyze the amount of funding allocated by Infrastructure Canada across non-urban federal electoral districts between 2006 and 2018. Our results indicate that non-urban governmental districts receive, on average, more money than opposition districts, and that this is even more the case for core government districts. In contrast, we found little evidence that cabinet ministers or senior MPs are able to attract more funding to their constituencies compared to other representatives

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