Credit Claiming by Labeling

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6245367
AutoresVirginia Oliveros (0000-0002-8335-1628, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA, autor correspondente), Rebecca Weitz‐shapiro (0000-0002-6620-2006, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA), Matthew S Winters (0000-0002-3693-9461, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA)
Ano2023
Volume56
Fascículo13
Páginas2099-2127
Data de publicação2023-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoComparative Political Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0010-4140 • E-ISSN: 1552-3829
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00104140231169016
OpenAlexW4362588464
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas45

We examine a phenomenon we call “credit claiming by labeling” in which a sitting politician places her name on a project, program, or policy with the goal of claiming credit for it. While the prevalence of this practice suggests that many politicians believe that credit claiming by labeling will aid their careers, there is little existing evidence on this question. We examine the effects of credit claiming by labeling with a survey experiment in Argentina. We find that it has a negative, though small, effect on respondents’ attitudes. Descriptive data suggests that these results stem from the perceived pervasiveness of the practice. We then use evidence from an additional treatment on the (un)biased selection of program beneficiaries to show that respondents actually reward politicians who neither label nor manipulate programs. These results suggest substantial obstacles to overturning citizens’ negative baseline beliefs about the politicized implementation of government programs

Baseline (sea · Business · Descriptive statistics · Economics · Government (linguistics · Phenomenon · Political science · Public economics · Public relations · Selection (genetic algorithm · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Development and Aid · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America