Why Play by the Rules? Constitutionalism and Democratic Institutionalization in Ecuador and Uruguay
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6253502 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Susan Albert, Susan Alberts (autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2008 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 849-869 |
| Data de publicação | 2008-12-01 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Democratization (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1351-0347 • E-ISSN: 1743-890X |
| Editora | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13510340802362646 |
| OpenAlex | W1993639105 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 1 |
do some countries institutionalize democracy while others languish in an ambiguous grey zone or revert to authoritarianism? Traditional explanations stressing levels of socioeconomic development, cultural attributes or institutional differences are beset by anomalies. This article presents a model of democratic institutionalization that eliminates the problem of anomalies by shifting the analytic focus from particular conditions to the incentives for political actors to adhere to basic democratic and practices. Why play by the rules? becomes the central question for explaining democratic institutionalization (or its absence). The article's analysis begins with the insight that political institutions generate incentives for diverse actors to play by the when they make it costly not to do so. Specifically, institutions generate incentives for rule-adherence when they extend protections, align interest with duty, and encourage negotiation and compromise. Examining constitutional survival provisions, electoral rules, and parties and party systems in Ecuador and Uruguay using this heuristic reveals the ways in which these institutional features generated incentives to uphold the formal and cooperate in governing in Uruguay, but disincentives to engage in those behaviors in Ecuador. These differences can be clearly linked to the contrasting post-transition democratic trajectories each country experienced. The article's findings clarify the mechanisms by which institutional choices facilitate or obstruct the emergence of constitutionalism --playing by the rules -- and influence the nature of democratic governance and a country's prospects for institutionalizing democracy
Authoritarianism · Constitutionalism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Institutionalisation · Law and economics · Market economy · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rule of law · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America
| Citações por ano | 0,2 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Altamente citado | Não |