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Why Play by the Rules? Constitutionalism and Democratic Institutionalization in Ecuador and Uruguay

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6253502
AutoresSusan Albert, Susan Alberts (autor correspondente)
Ano2008
Volume15
Fascículo5
Páginas849-869
Data de publicação2008-12-01
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDemocratization (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1351-0347 • E-ISSN: 1743-890X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13510340802362646
OpenAlexW1993639105
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1

do some countries institutionalize democracy while others languish in an ambiguous grey zone or revert to authoritarianism? Traditional explanations stressing levels of socioeconomic development, cultural attributes or institutional differences are beset by anomalies. This article presents a model of democratic institutionalization that eliminates the problem of anomalies by shifting the analytic focus from particular conditions to the incentives for political actors to adhere to basic democratic and practices. Why play by the rules? becomes the central question for explaining democratic institutionalization (or its absence). The article's analysis begins with the insight that political institutions generate incentives for diverse actors to play by the when they make it costly not to do so. Specifically, institutions generate incentives for rule-adherence when they extend protections, align interest with duty, and encourage negotiation and compromise. Examining constitutional survival provisions, electoral rules, and parties and party systems in Ecuador and Uruguay using this heuristic reveals the ways in which these institutional features generated incentives to uphold the formal and cooperate in governing in Uruguay, but disincentives to engage in those behaviors in Ecuador. These differences can be clearly linked to the contrasting post-transition democratic trajectories each country experienced. The article's findings clarify the mechanisms by which institutional choices facilitate or obstruct the emergence of constitutionalism --playing by the rules -- and influence the nature of democratic governance and a country's prospects for institutionalizing democracy

Authoritarianism · Constitutionalism · Corporate governance · Democracy · Economics · Incentive · Institutionalisation · Law and economics · Market economy · Negotiation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rule of law · Law · Politics and Society in Latin America

  • Oiling Congress

    Open Access•Raúl Aldaz Peña•Journal of Politics in Latin…•2021

Citações por ano0,2
Intervalo de citações2021 - 2021 (1)
Altamente citadoNão

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