Lights on the shadows of public procurement

Transparency as an antidote to corruption

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6263296
AutoresMonika Bauhr (0000-0002-2659-8229, University of Gothenburg), Ágnes Czibik (Government Transparency Institute), Jenny De Fine Licht (0000-0003-2102-8945, University of Gothenburg), Mihály Fazekas (0000-0002-8477-3961, Central European University)
Ano2020
Volume33
Fascículo3
Páginas495-523
Data de publicação2020-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoGovernance (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12432
OpenAlexW2967037639
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas45
Referências citadas71

The increased focus on marketizing mechanisms and contracting‐out operations following the New Public Management reform agenda has sparked a debate on whether the close interactions between public and private actors might drive corruption in the public sector. The main response to those worries has been increased transparency, but so far empirical evidence of its efficiency remains scant and mixed. This article argues that the beneficial effects of transparency on corruption are contingent on type of transparency, and in particular, who the intended receiver of the information is. Drawing on newly collected data of more than 3.5 million government contracts between 2006 and 2015, the analysis shows that overall tender transparency reduces corruption risks substantially, yet that the effect is largely driven by ex ante transparency, that is, transparency that allows for horizontal monitoring by insiders in the bidding process

Bidding · Business · Economics · Empirical evidence · Language change · Political science · Procurement · Public economics · Public relations · Transparency (behavior · Auction Theory and Applications · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Public Administration · Public Procurement and Policy · Marketing