Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6263772 |
|---|---|
| Autores | James Simmie (0000-0003-4194-9792), Susan French, Susan C French |
| Ano | 1991 |
| Volume | 4 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 19-41 |
| Data de publicação | 1991-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Governance (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1991.tb00002.x |
| OpenAlex | W2161256161 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 14 |
This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London.In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non‐local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non‐local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state.Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before.Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site.In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans.The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs.Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long‐term, non‐issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned
Business · Corporatism · Economic system · Economics · Intermediation · Local government · Political science · Politics · Statutory law · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Public Administration · Finance
Patterns of corporatist policy-making
State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism
The Political Economy of Corporatism
Power, Property and Corporatism
Remaking planning
Corporatism, Pluralism, and Professional Memory
Still the Century of Corporatism
Pluralistic Corporatisms and Corporate Pluralism
Pluralism and the New Corporatism
The Old and New Testaments of Corporatism
Pluralism, Corporatism and the Role of the State
Public Participation and Planners' Blight
Class Conflict and the Industrial Relations Crisis
| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,06 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1992 - 2000 (9) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |