On Nuclear Superiority and National Security

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6283374
AutoresAlexandre Debs (0000-0002-3114-490X, Yale University, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Data de publicação2025-05-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027251338457
OpenAlexW4410061892
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas51

Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuclear balance matters militarily, perhaps allowing an escape from the nuclear stalemate, and show that greater nuclear capabilities unambiguously improve security under narrow circumstances. If they improve first-strike advantages or if the nuclear stalemate is fragile, they may improve peaceful terms, but only by raising the risk of disaster. I discuss the implications of this argument for our understanding of the U.S. nuclear policy in the Cold War

Computer security · International security · National security · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Computer Science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Public Administration