The Uniform N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Construction and Test of an Index of Cooperation
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6283669 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Dwight J Goehring (Department of Psychology University of Southern California), James P Kahan (Department of Psychology University of Southern California) |
| Ano | 1976 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 111-128 |
| Data de publicação | 1976-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277602000104 |
| OpenAlex | W2132214725 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 21 |
| Referências citadas | 26 |
The familiar two-person prisoner's dilemma (PD) game can be considered a special case of a general family of games with more than two players. This family of games is of particular interest, having been suggested as a model for a variety of social conflict situations. A subset of this family of games, called the uniform PD, is defined, for which the members of the subset may be scaled along a dimension of competitiveness for any given number of players. An index of competitiveness was derived and tested for the three-person case. Sixty volunteer subjects played one of five three-person uniform PD games, chosen to vary across the range of values of the index. Each triad played 150 trials of the same game for points which were converted to cash at the end of the experiment. Subjects were run in triads homogeneous with respect to sex; effects due to that variable were absent. The obtained proportions of cooperative response were found to be strongly related to the value of the index. The approach offers a theoretical basis for assessment of behavior in multiperson conflict situations of the PD variety
Cash · Combinatorics · Dilemma · Dimension (graph theory · Economics · Game theory · Homogeneous · Index (typography · Mathematical economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Statistics · Triad (sociology · Value (mathematics · Variable (mathematics · Variety (cybernetics · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Sex differences in cooperation
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision
Sex, Fear, and Greed
Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good
Cooperative choice in N-person dilemma situation
Are Women More Cooperative Than Men in Social Dilemmas
Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System
Gender Roles and Behavior in Social Dilemmas
A Structural Social Psychological View of Gender Differences in Cooperation
Components of reward in social dilemmas
Distribution of the cost of maintaining common resources
Cooperative choice among individuals versus groups in an N-person dilemma situation
Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity
Institutions and the Free Rider
Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
Selective Incentives in an Apex Game
Implicit Coalitions in a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma
Alternative Choices in Social Dilemmas
Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision-Making
Tragedy of the Commons (Poetry)
Rationality, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and Population 1
N‐person Prisoner's Dilemma
Errors in perception of intentions in a mixed-motive game
Collaboration among six persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma game
Reward structure and cooperation
Motivational processes in the decomposed Prisoner's Dilemma game
Conflict between individual and common interest in an N-person relationship
Concern for the common good in an N-person game
Cooperation in a three-person Prisoner's Dilemma
Effect of psychopathology of group consensus and cooperative choice in a six-person game
The Decision to Pollute
| Obras citantes distintas | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,42 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1976 - 2011 (36) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 20 |