Peace and War With Endogenous State Capacity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6284073
AutoresMichael Mcbride (0000-0002-5274-7275), Gary Milante (The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA), Stergios Skaperda (0000-0001-7095-3956, University of California, Irvine), Stergios Skaperdas (Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA)
Ano2011
Volume55
Fascículo3
Páginas446-468
Data de publicação2011-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002711400862
OpenAlexW2152269067
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas26
Referências citadas35

We explore how peace or war can occur in the presence of commitment problems. These problems can be reduced by institutions of good governance or, alternatively, state capacity which (a) can be considered a collective good and (b) can be improved through investments. We show how the likelihood of a peace agreement depends on the level of state capacity and on investments in state capacity made by adversaries. In accordance with existing evidence but contrary to various theories of conflict, we find that income levels unambiguously increase the chance of peace. Among other issues, we discuss the critical role of external actors in encouraging or discouraging commitment and in developing good governance institutions

Corporate governance · Economic system · Economics · Good governance · Political economy · Political science · State (computer science · International Development and Aid · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East