The Effects of Intragroup Communication on Intergroup Cooperation in the Repeated Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) Game

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6284673
AutoresHarel Goren (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Gary Bornstein (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Ano2000
Volume44
Fascículo5
Páginas700-719
Data de publicação2000-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002700044005007
OpenAlexW2161619543
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas29

The intergroup prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game was played repeatedly in an attempt to distinguish the dynamic process associated with reciprocation at the intergroup level from that resulting from adaptation at the individual level. Results show that when players were not allowed to communicate with one another, they gradually learned that it does not pay to participate, but when within-group communication was allowed, the overall effect was to increase individual participation. However, this effect varied greatly in later stages of the game. In some cases, intragroup communication eliminated individual participation and rewarded the members of both teams with the mutually cooperative outcome, but in other cases, it intensified the intergroup conflict to its maximal level of full participation. The implications of these findings for conflict resolution are discussed

Conflict resolution · Dilemma · Economics · Group conflict · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology