Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6285484 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Amy T Yuen (0000-0003-2603-7461, Middlebury College, autor correspondente), Amy Yuen (Department of Political Science Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT) |
| Ano | 2009 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Fascículo | 5 |
| Páginas | 745-773 |
| Data de publicação | 2009-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002709339046 |
| OpenAlex | W2151236291 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 41 |
| Referências citadas | 45 |
Why do targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance? Both the extended deterrence and alliance literatures point to unreliable third parties to explain deterrence failure and target acquiescence. On the other hand, the alliance literature also suggests that third parties present a moral-hazard situation in which targets will behave less prudently when they have outside support. Without dismissing the importance of these dynamics, I demonstrate that targets will still make concessions when intervention is certain, and that interveners do not always embolden targets in crisis situations. Counterintuitively, interveners alter the bargaining situation, shifting the bargaining space so that conceding is more attractive than war for the target state. Instead of emboldening targets, third parties deter larger demands and produce settlement outcomes that reduce the burden on the target
Acquiescence · Alliance · Business · Deterrence theory · Economics · Incentive · Intervention (counseling · Law and economics · Market economy · Moral hazard · Negotiation · Point (geometry · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Settlement (finance · Shadow (psychology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology
Why Do States Sign Alliances?
Constructing International Security
Testing Allies Through Conflict
Collective Deterrence
Third Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization
Barriers to Peace in Civil War
Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
Defense Pacts
Gas on the Fire
Large-state liability in alliance politics
Between indifference and coercion
Intervention, war expansion, and the international sources of civil war
Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective
Misaligned interests and the credibility of alleged support
What Is the Relationship Between Alliance and Militarized Conflict? Analysis of Reciprocal Causation
Coalition Politics and War Termination
Alliance Reliability and Dispute Escalation
Exploring the Threshold between Conflict Management and Joining in Biased Interventions
Great Power Intervention and War
The Mercurial Commitment
What Does It Mean to Be a Reliable Ally
Assessing the Variation of Formal Military Alliances
The Coevolution of Networks of Interstate Support, Interstate Threat, and Civil War
Diplomatic Signaling among Multiple States
War and diplomacy on the world stage
The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence
Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts
All Alliances Are Multilateral
Crisis Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Opportunism
Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Power, Preferences, and Balancing
Only Here to Help? Bargaining and the Perverse Incentives of International Institutions
A Strategic Logic of the MilitaryFait Accompli
Mutual Optimism as a Cause of Conflict
Collective Deterrence in the Shadow of Shifting Power
To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances
When and Whom to Join
Asymmetric burden-sharing and the restraining and deterrence effects of alliances
Ally provocateur
International politics by other means
Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict
In the Shadow of Power
The Causes of War
War and Punishment
War and the State
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War
A Study of Crisis
Reputation and imperfect information
The chain store paradox
Conflict Among Nations
Perfect Deterrence
Deterrence and Defense
The hazards of thinking about moral hazard
The Winter War
The Appeal That Was Never Made
Conflict among Nations
The Winter War
Germany, Hitler, and World War II
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics
War Expansion and War Outcome
Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs
Not Only Whether but Whom
The calculus of deterrence
The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence
The War Proneness of Alliances
Third-Party Participation in Wars
To Intervene or Not to Intervene
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence
Alliance Formation and War
Choosing Sides in Wars
Rationalist explanations for war
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
Deterring Intervention
Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Bargaining and War
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement
Information, Power, and War
| Obras citantes distintas | 41 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2,56 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 41 |