The Impact of Domestic Surveillance on Political Imprisonment

Evidence from the German Democratic Republic

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6285657
AutoresChristoph V Steinert (0000-0003-1760-3214, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume67
Fascículo1
Páginas38-65
Data de publicação2023-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027221109797
OpenAlexW4283731214
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas44

How does domestic surveillance affect the frequency of political imprisonments in autocratic states? In contrast to conventional wisdom, I argue that surveillance reduces the frequency of political imprisonments in power-maximizing autocracies. Surveillance decreases uncertainty about the correct targets of repression, allowing for more selective detentions and shifts to silent instruments of repression. To investigate these claims, I draw on a unique county-level dataset of political imprisonment in the German Democratic Republic between 1984 and 1988. I proxy the number of monitored individuals with newly collected county-level data on surveillance operations. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and instrumental variable models to investigate the impact of surveillance on political imprisonment. I find that higher shares of spies per monitored individual were associated with a reduction of political imprisonment. Further, increasing levels of spy infiltration were linked to a systematic shift to silent instruments of repression

Autocracy · Democracy · Demographic economics · Development economics · Econometrics · Economics · Geography · German · Imprisonment · Ordinary least squares · Political economy · Political repression · Political science · Politics · Proxy (statistics · Statistics · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Political Conflict and Governance