What Putin Fears Most
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6287458 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Robert Person, Michael Mcfaul |
| Ano | 2022 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 18-27 |
| Data de publicação | 2022-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of democracy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1045-5736 • E-ISSN: 1086-3214 |
| Editora | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1353/jod.2022.0015 |
| OpenAlex | W4223925222 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 36 |
Russian president Vladimir Putin wants you to believe that NATO is responsible for his February 24 invasion of Ukraine—that rounds of NATO enlargement made Russia insecure, forcing Putin to lash out. This argument has two key flaws. First, NATO has been a variable and not a constant source of tension between Russia and the West. Moscow has in the past acknowledged Ukraine's right to join NATO; the Kremlin's complaints about the alliance spike in a clear pattern after democratic breakthroughs in the post-Soviet space. This highlights a second flaw: Since Putin fears democracy and the threat that it poses to his regime, and not expanded NATO membership, taking the latter off the table will not quell his insecurity. His declared goal of the invasion, the "denazification" of Ukraine, is a code for his real aim: antidemocratic regime change
Alliance · Argument (complex analysis · Democracy · Economics · European union · International trade · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Resizing · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
Making amends
Measuring Central and Eastern European Countries’ Responses to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
War in Ukraine as a long-term effect of Nato intervention against Yugoslavia? An overview
Forum
Signalling and Balancing in the Conflict in Ukraine from 2014 to 2016
How wars don’t end
The “Lebensraum” Reconsidered
Depoliticising democracy through discourse
Russian adventurism and Central Asian leaders’ foreign policy rhetoric
Prospect Theory, Groupthink, and Amplified Frames of Loss
No relief from war
Introduction
The Ukraine invasion
The Dayton Peace Process
Why Russia attacked Ukraine
Roots of Ukrainian resilience and the agency of Ukrainian society before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion
Russia’s War Against Ukraine
Deterrence and Missed Opportunities
Russian Foreign Policy Research and War in Ukraine
Near Abroad
Sympathy or Criticism? The European Far Left and Far Right React to Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Crisis bargaining, domestic politics and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
International Relations Theory and the Ukrainian War
Inside Vladimir Putin’s Hall of Mirrors
Geopolitics and autocratisation in hybrid regimes
Russia's Aggression, Ukraine's Resilience, and the Future of Eurasian Security
Disrupting the Narrative
What is Wrong with Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism
Far left and far right party reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Why Russia invaded Ukraine and how wars benefit autocrats
Ideological Topography in World Politics
Are Leaders Rational
Elections, Succession, and Legitimacy in Ukraine
Russia's state capture strategy in Africa, from Wagner to the Africa corps
Probing the humanitarian securitisation approach to great-power wars
Conflict exposure and democratic values
| Obras citantes distintas | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 9 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 36 |