Representative Government and Special Interest Politics
We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6299359 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Susanne Lohmann (0000-0002-1478-4534, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2003 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 299-319 |
| Data de publicação | 2003-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951692803015003004 |
| OpenAlex | W2087785915 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 14 |
| Referências citadas | 18 |
In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistribution on most dimensions of public policy, including many dimensions on which the citizen is a member of the general public, the vast majority of citizens would surely be better off if the government did not cater to special interests at all. With this common interest in place, why do democratic societies have such a hard time ridding themselves of special interest politics? This article argues that the driving force underlying special interest politics is an information asymmetry: each citizen has a precise idea about the special interest handouts she is receiving and a vague idea about the price she is paying, as a member of the general public, for inefficient redistribution. I explain why special interest politics are ultimately impervious to reform (though we can tame them at the margin); I examine the trade-offs inherent in reform efforts (what it costs to tame them); and I spell out why special interest politics can be a Good Thing (why we should not tame them all the way even if we could
Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public good · Public interest · Redistribution (election · Special Interest Group · Status quo · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
The Non‐Politics of Monetary Policy
Parlamentares no presidencialismo de coalizão
A model of optimising political expenditures to buy government power
A theoretical foundation for assessing principal-agent problems in lobbying ethics and an empirical test
The (un)heavenly chorus in British politics
Managing the politics of innovation and sustainability
Interest groups and economic performance
The need for durable institutions for future generations
Explaining interest group access to the European Commission’s expert groups
Risk, Regulation and Crisis
Institutional roots of economic decline
Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Societal Interests
Karaokê da Câmara dos Deputados
Modeling and testing the diffusion of expectations
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
The Political Business Cycle
The Logic of Collective Action
Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs
The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
Why Poor People Stay Poor. Urban Bias in World Development
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
| Obras citantes distintas | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,64 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2004 - 2021 (18) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 14 |