A Tale of Two Cities

Bureaucratisation in Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Municipalities

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6301975
AutoresVictor Lapuente (0000-0001-6415-9422, University of Gothenburg, autor correspondente)
Ano2010
Volume36
Fascículo6
Páginas739-757
Data de publicação2010-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoLocal Government Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0300-3930 • E-ISSN: 1743-9388
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03003930.2010.523200
OpenAlexW1973342047
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas48

This paper presents a theory that predicts under what circumstances self-interested politicians 'bureaucratise' their administrations, in the sense that they delegate the powers to hire, fire and promote public employees to autonomous bodies (like civil service commissions). The main testable proposition is that, in polities with a higher concentration of powers, politicians will bureaucratise their administrations to overcome time inconsistency problems in their relationships with public employees. This prediction is tested with data drawn from US municipalities, where two main types of local governments co-exist: mayor-council and council-manager. Results show that municipal governments with a higher concentration of powers (i.e. mayor-council) tend to have more bureaucratised administrations

Business · Decentralization · Delegate · Municipal council · Political science · Public sector · Public service · Service (business · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research