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A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6325552
AutoresLarry S Temkin (Institute of Economic Affairs, autor correspondente)
Ano1996
Volume25
Fascículo3
Páginas175-210
Data de publicação1996-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy & Public Affairs (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0048-3915 • E-ISSN: 1088-4963
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1088-4963.1996.tb00039.x
OpenAlexW2046852913
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas63
Referências citadas2

Argument (complex analysis · Economic Justice · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral philosophy · Political science · Sociology · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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Obras citantes distintas63
Citações por ano2,1
Intervalo de citações1996 - 2026 (31)
Velocidade de citaçãocurrent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 63
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