Design paths of federal intergovernmental cooperation
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6328516 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Simon Montfort (0000-0003-2072-7226, Institute of Political Science University of Bern Bern Switzerland, autor correspondente), Manuel Fischer (0000-0003-3065-0891, Institute of Political Science University of Bern Bern Switzerland), James Hollway (0000-0002-8361-9647, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Geneva Switzerland), Nicolas W Jager (0000-0002-6706-6595, SOCIUM – Research Center on Inequality and Social Policy University of Bremen Bremen Germany) |
| Ano | 2023 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 773-792 |
| Data de publicação | 2023-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/psj.12498 |
| OpenAlex | W4361010051 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 6 |
| Referências citadas | 73 |
Actors rarely approach institutional design choices with a blank slate but are influenced by design choices made at earlier stages. How does institutional design evolve over time and are there specific paths to deepening cooperation? We investigate the institutional design paths of subnational cooperation that are chosen to address increasingly complex and interconnected policy problems. We theorize that besides the substantive problem, earlier choices matter to explain what institutional design mechanism is chosen; that is, the design of existing institutions between two subnational governance units, called substates, influences the design of subsequent institutions. Using a semi‐parametric Cox proportional hazards model, we show that the design paths of subnational cooperation in the Swiss water governance sector correlate with earlier design choices. Our results indicate that not all cooperation is self‐reinforcing and path‐dependent, but they show which specific design choices are more likely to follow each other in repeated formal federal intergovernmental cooperation
Corporate governance · Economics · Management · Mechanism Design · Microeconomics · Path (computing · Political science · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration
Governing the Commons
Modeling Survival Data
Intergovernmental Cooperation
Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’
Revisiting the Commons
Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources
Regression Models and Life-Tables
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Power in Global Governance
The Divided Welfare State
Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change
Subnational Hydropolitics
Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
Working Together
Event History Modeling
A Review of Design Principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management
International conflict and cooperation over freshwater resources
Problem Structure, Institutional Design, and the Relative Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
Is There a Democracy–Civil Society Paradox in Global Environmental Governance
Path dependence and regional economic evolution
What Are International Institutions
The Institutionalization of River Treaties
Ideas, private institutions and American welfare state ‘exceptionalism’
Let's Talk Cash’
Neighbours or Friends? When Swiss Cantonal Governments Co-operate with Each Other
Assessing the effectiveness of intergovernmental organisations in international environmental politics
Demand, supply, and restraint
Water-Related Intrastate Conflict and Cooperation (Waricc)
Convergence and Divergence in ‘New Governance’ Arrangements
Duration Models for Repeated Events
The Silent Reform of Swiss Federalism
Strength in Numbers
Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland
How Policy-Specific Factors Influence Horizontal Cooperation among Subnational Governments
The Costs of Compliance with Interstate Agreements
Proper Specification of Nonproportional Hazards Corrections in Duration Models
Change Comes with Time
The Institutional Collective Action Framework
Resolving Water Conflicts
Collective Action and the Evolution of Intergovernmental Cooperation
Threats to Common‐Pool Resources and the Importance of Forums
The Role of Cross‐Scale Institutional Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management
Paths and Forks or Chutes and Ladders
Horizontal Federalism
Principal-Agent Models
Beyond Trade
The Institutional Design of Riparian Treaties
Checking for Updates
Fragmented Governance of International Rivers
Global Regime Formation or Complex Institution Building? The Principled Content of International River Agreements
Rational Design
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
Situation Structure and Institutional Design
Perceiving Credible Commitments
Beyond the Hazard Ratio
Institutions for the Anthropocene
Understanding the historical turn in the policy sciences
The New Institutional Economics
Implications of hydro-political dependency for international water cooperation and conflict
Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics
| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 6 |