Voluntary Environmental Programs in the Public Sector
Evaluating an Urban Water Conservation Program in California
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6328971 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Sara Hughes (0000-0002-1282-6235, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2012 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 650-673 |
| Data de publicação | 2012-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1541-0072.2012.00468.x |
| OpenAlex | W2135867805 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 8 |
| Referências citadas | 76 |
Solving conflictual environmental policy problems is increasingly falling under the purview of local governments and public agencies. Nonregulatory approaches, such as the development of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs), could offer a useful policy alternative as they often have greater political traction and flexibility. However, there has been little work examining the use of VEPs in the public sector. This article uses a new dataset from California to examine how political institutions affect decisions by local governments and public agencies to participate in a voluntary urban water conservation program and whether this program has improved the water conservation performance of its members. The results show that special district governments, private utilities, and water suppliers dependent on purchased water are more likely to participate in the program and to join early. However, urban water agencies that have joined the program have not reduced their per capita water use more than those that have not. These results underscore the influence of political institutions in public‐sector decision making and demonstrate that, as in the private sector, commitment to a VEP by local government and public agencies does not guarantee implementation or environmental improvements. While voluntary programs offer political and administrative advantages, in order for VEPs in the public sector to be effective they must be accompanied and supported by credible enforcement mechanisms, performance standards, and rigorous monitoring programs
Business · Economic growth · Economics · Enforcement · Environmental health · Flexibility (engineering · Government (linguistics · Local government · Per capita · Political science · Politics · Private sector · Public economics · Public sector · Turnover · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies · Water resources management and optimization
Local factors driving the adoption of municipal voluntary environmental programs
Do water board elections matter for utility performance
How State Mandates Moderate the Utility Ownership and Conservation Relationship in Municipal Water Governance
Coping with scarcity
Does Outsourcing Reduce Public Scrutiny Toward Elected Officials
Specialized Local Government and Water Conservation Policy in the United States
Local Community Characteristics and Cooperation for Shared Green Reputation
Reassessing “City Limits” in Urban Public Policy
Governing the Tap
Polycentric Governance and Development
Non‐Mandatory Approaches to Environmental Protection
Why Do Firms Volunteer to Exceed Environmental Regulations? Understanding Participation in EPA's 33/50 Program
Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions
Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling
Voluntary Environmental Agreements
EPA's Voluntary 33/50 Program
State and Municipal Climate Change Plans
The Use of Matched Sampling and Regression Adjustment to Remove Bias in Observational Studies
Water is an economic good
Historical institutional analysis of social-ecological systems
The great thirst
Privatizing Municipal Water and Wastewater Systems
Climate change and global water resources
Institutional adaptation to climate change
Canada's voluntary Aret program
Covenants with weak swords
Beyond Ideal Types of Municipal Structure
Stakeholder Involvement in the Design of U.S. Voluntary Environmental Programs
American Environmental Policy, 1990–2006
The External Control of Organizations
The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas
Contracting out
Governmental Fragmentation versus Consolidation
Innovation in Public Management
The Dynamics of Policy Change
Assessing a voluntary environmental initiative in the developing world
Bureaucratic Theory Meets Reality
Risk, Stress, and Capacity
Institutional Ties, Transaction Costs, and External Service Production
A Duration Model for the Estimation of the Contracting Out of Urban Water Management in Southern Spain
Political Institutions and Conservation by Local Governments
Interlocal Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks
Testing Competing Explanations for Policy Adoption
Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference
The Effectiveness of Voluntary Environmental Programs—A Policy at a Crossroads
Motivations for Voluntary Environmental Management
Is Greener Whiter Yet? The Sustainable Slopes Program after Five Years
Collective Action through Voluntary Environmental Programs
Is Greener Whiter? Voluntary Environmental Performance of Western Ski Areas
Are Members of Business for Social Responsibility More Socially Responsible
Voluntary Approaches to Environmental Problems
Assessing the Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs
Interests and Implementation
Leadership Credibility, Board Relations, and Administrative Innovation at the Local Government Level
Understanding the Adoption and Timing of Economic Development Strategies in US Cities Using Innovation and Institutional Analysis
Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations for Government Service Production Decisions
The Conditional Effect of Specialized Governance on Public Policy
Economic Constraint and Political Choice in Urban Policymaking
The Local Roots of American Inequality
Treating Networks Seriously
A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective
| Obras citantes distintas | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,73 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 8 |