Coalition Opportunity Structures and Advocacy Coordination in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6329038
AutoresK Satoh (0000-0003-3316-301X, Hitotsubashi University Tokyo Japan), Antti Gronow (0000-0002-7639-6422, University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland, autor correspondente), Tuomas Ylä-Anttila (0000-0002-6908-3495, University of Helsinki Helsinki Finland), Tuomas Ylä‐anttila, Ana Delicado (0000-0001-9657-396X, Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa Lisboa Portugal), L Schmidt (0000-0002-7449-8636, University of Lisbon), Pradip Swarnakar (0000-0002-9532-1215, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur Kanpur India), Paul M Wagner (0000-0001-7020-3952, Edinburgh Napier Business School Edinburgh Scotland), Sun-Jin Yun (0000-0002-0461-0151, Seoul National University), Sun‐jin Yun (Seoul National University Seoul South Korea)
Ano2025
Data de publicação2025-08-18
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolicy Studies Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/psj.70067
OpenAlexW4413281512
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas47

Research on advocacy coalitions suggests that belief homophily—the tendency of actors to coordinate based on shared policy beliefs—drives coalition formation. However, coalition opportunity structures, which are shaped by institutional contexts, may influence the extent to which belief homophily matters. We argue that coordination dynamics differ between majoritarian and consensus democracies. While majoritarian systems promote moderate norms of compromise and open decision‐making processes, consensus democracies foster stronger norms of cross‐coalition cooperation. Consequently, belief homophily may be a stronger driver of coordination in majoritarian democracies than in consensus democracies, where broader cooperation is needed to introduce policy change. To test this hypothesis, we use data from climate change policy subsystems in nine countries and apply a multilevel structural equation model to examine coordination patterns. Our results show that the more majoritarian a country's institutions are, the more actors coordinate with like‐minded partners. Additionally, in majoritarian systems, coordination is more likely to involve influential actors, emphasizing power dynamics. Conversely, coordination in consensus democracies is less dependent on belief homophily, and broad‐based cooperation is more prevalent. These results underscore how institutional contexts shape advocacy coalitions and contribute to a comparative understanding of advocacy coordination

Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Policy Transfer and Learning · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research