Strategic Voting and Coordination Problems in Proportional Systems

An Experimental Study

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6338958
AutoresAndré Blais (0000-0003-4292-110X, Université de Montréal), Cengiz Erisen (0000-0001-9809-6087, TOBB University of Economics and Technology), Ludovic Rheault (0000-0002-9599-0427, University of California, Riverside)
Ano2014
Volume67
Fascículo2
Páginas386-397
Data de publicação2014-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912913520573
OpenAlexW2046587431
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas24

We investigate strategic voting in proportional representation (PR) systems where parties are organized in pre-electoral coalitions and subject to a vote threshold. We show that such political systems are likely to generate coordination problems among the supporters of a coalition, and we examine voter behavior in this setting using a laboratory experiment with repeated rounds of elections. Our findings suggest that in absence of electoral history, voters cannot coordinate their efforts successfully and are more likely to vote sincerely. However, as history becomes available, the vote threshold induces strategic coordination on parties that performed best in previous elections

Contingent vote · Coordination game · Democracy · Economics · Electoral system · Group voting ticket · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Proportional representation · Ranked voting system · Representation (politics · Straight-ticket voting · Voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Public Administration