Exporting Air Pollution? Regulatory Enforcement and Environmental Free Riding in the United States

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6340290
AutoresDavid M Konisky (0000-0002-1146-3938, Georgetown University), Nathan D Woods (0000-0001-8556-4769, University of South Carolina), Neal D Woods
Ano2010
Volume63
Fascículo4
Páginas771-782
Data de publicação2010-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912909334429
OpenAlexW2153798036
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas38
Referências citadas32

Political jurisdictions have incentives to promote pollution spillovers to capture the benefits of economic production within their borders while exporting the environmental costs to their neighbors. The authors examine the extent to which U.S. states engage in this type of free-riding behavior. Studying enforcement of the federal Clean Air Act from 1990 through 2000, the authors employ zero-inflated negative binomial regression to predict the number of state-initiated enforcement actions conducted in counties bordering other jurisdictions. They find that states perform fewer enforcement actions in counties adjacent to international borders but no evidence that states conduct less enforcement in counties that border other states

Air pollution · Business · Clean Air Act · Economics · Enforcement · Free riding · Incentive · Law enforcement · Microeconomics · Negative binomial distribution · Political science · Public economics · State (computer science · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Pollution