Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover under Political Uncertainty

The Case of Ecuador

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6340802
AutoresSantiago Basabe-Serrano (0000-0002-8615-6908, FLACSO, Quito, Ecuador), J Polga-Hecimovich (0000-0002-0711-6255, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA)
Ano2013
Volume66
Fascículo1
Páginas154-166
Data de publicação2013-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912911436319
OpenAlexW2068582979
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas36

While judicial turnover in Latin American high courts is often the result of political realignments within the executive branch, the judiciary may also be sensitive to realignments in the legislative branch. The authors use data from the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court to show that under some circumstances, congressional deputies will seek to remove judges further from their own ideal points as the composition of the legislative coalition changes. This provides some of the first empirical evidence of the role legislatures play in Latin American judicial instability and may be broadly generalizable to other countries with similar institutional profiles and rates of interbranch crisis

Chamber of Deputies · Economics · Executive branch · Judicial review · Latin Americans · Law and economics · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Separation of powers · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration