Judicial Reform in Mexico

Political Insurance or the Search for Political Legitimacy

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6340992
AutoresSilvia Inclán Oseguera (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume62
Fascículo4
Páginas753-766
Data de publicação2009-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1065912909346740
OpenAlexW2161791102
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas6
Referências citadas11

Judicial reform presents a paradox: What makes governing elites decide to grant power to an autonomous judiciary that will eventually curtail their own powers? The engagement of governing elites in judicial reforms is recently being explained as strategic moves to protect their interests when they can foresee a future loss of political control. Using the Mexican reform process of 1994-95, this work discusses the applicability of such perspective for this case and offers an alternative explanation based on the reformers’ need to legitimize their rule in a context marked by political competition and a discredited supreme court

Competition (biology · Context (archaeology · Judicial reform · Judicial review · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Supreme court · Work (physics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies