Power orchestrates
How Leadership Shapes National Representation in International Organizations
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6341997 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jidong Chen (0000-0002-4040-6350, Tsinghua University, autor correspondente), Tianhan Gui (0000-0001-6069-3046, Tsinghua University), Lei Wang (0000-0001-5326-565X, Tsinghua University) |
| Ano | 2025 |
| Páginas | 1-23 |
| Data de publicação | 2025-11-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Political Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/psrm.2025.10056 |
| OpenAlex | W7105882240 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 2 |
| Referências citadas | 49 |
This study investigates how states leverage leadership positions in international organizations (IOs) to enhance their staff representation. Using an original dataset of 25 United Nations system agencies from 1996 to 2022, we show that leadership roles can help states enhance their staff representation. Two mechanisms drive this influence: leaders secure voluntary contributions from their home countries to create favorable conditions for national representation, and they cultivate positive institutional relationships that facilitate greater staffing opportunities. Further analysis reveals that leaders from developing countries have demonstrated increasing effectiveness in strengthening their nations’ representation over time. Meanwhile, countries closely connected to leadership-holding states also gain staff representation. These dynamics may carry performance costs, raising broader implications for global governance
Developing country · Distributed leadership · Dynamics (music · Leverage (statistics · Power (physics · Representation (politics · Servant leadership · Staffing · International Development and Aid · Public Policy and Administration Research · Public Relations and Crisis Communication
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| Obras citantes distintas | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 2 |