Incentivizing Regulatory Participation
Effectiveness of a Fundraising Levy
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6360481 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Alasdair C Rutherford (0000-0003-2530-1195, University of Stirling, autor correspondente), Diarmuid Mcdonnell (0000-0003-4468-1605, University of Birmingham, autor correspondente), Eddy Hogg (University of Kent, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 532-542 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-03-18 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/puar.13176 |
| OpenAlex | W2994852339 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 6 |
| Referências citadas | 54 |
In the absence of a statutory instrument to enforce payment of a regulatory fee, regulators must rely on a combination of “carrots” and “sticks” to encourage financial contributions by the organizations they oversee. In contrast to studies of public funding of nonprofits, this article empirically evaluates the effectiveness of a government policy to rely on nonprofit funding of statutory regulation. The authors exploit a sharp discontinuity in the eligibility threshold for charities contributing to the new Fundraising Regulator in England and Wales to estimate a causal effect of the levy on participation. The article shows that the regulator's threat to “name and shame” was effective at incentivizing regulatory participation and generating income, but it raises some concerns about the long‐term viability of this approach. The results are significant at a time when many jurisdictions are considering how best to fund the regulation of nonprofits
Business · Economics · Exploit · Government (linguistics · Government regulation · Payment · Political science · Public economics · Regulator · Statutory law · Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting · Finance · Law · Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Obras citantes distintas | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,2 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 6 |