Welfare Reform, Mississippi Style
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and the Search for Accountability
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 6366188 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David A Breaux (Mississippi State University), Christopher M Duncan (0000-0002-0645-4762, University of Dayton), C Denise Keller, John C Morris (0000-0001-9820-5618, Mississippi State University) |
| Ano | 2002 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 92-103 |
| Data de publicação | 2002-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Public Administration Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0033-3352 • E-ISSN: 1540-6210 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1540-6210.00158 |
| OpenAlex | W2030304277 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 32 |
| Referências citadas | 12 |
Through an examination of the implementation of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in the state of Mississippi, we explore the adequacy of traditional two‐actor principal‐agent theory. Using this as our lens, we suggest that the choices made by Mississippi in the area of welfare reform to privatize much of the work and to add several layers to the existing principal‐agent relationship substantially reduced accountability and the effectiveness of the monitoring systems. We conclude that not only is traditional principal‐agent theory an insufficient tool for understanding the complex interrelationship between democratic actors in this particular case, the decisions of the state of Mississippi to complicate the principal‐actor relationship through privatization also undermined the reform effort itself in ways that may have general implications for other like‐minded efforts in other policy areas.There are those who are undermining what we are trying to achieve ...—Bud Henry, Director of Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services
Accountability · Democracy · Economics · Political science · Principal (computer security · State (computer science · Welfare · Welfare reform · Work (physics · Engineering · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Public Administration · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Aligning accountability arrangements for ambiguous goals
Understanding Accountability Overload
Imagining Justice
The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability
Individual, organizational, and institutional accountability
Should Government Go It Alone or With a Partner? A Comparison of Outcomes from a Work Release Program Using Different Policy Tools
What Works Best When Contracting for Services? An Analysis of Contracting Performance at the Local Level in the Us
Implementing Performance‐based Funding for Health Research
A Tangled Web of Principals and Agents
Buying innovation
Implementation of the Welfare‐to‐Work Program in Arkansas
The Global and the Local
Government and Market Pathologies of Privatization
Walking the High Wire
In Search of Middle Ground
Are We Really on the Same Page? An Empirical Examination of Value Congruence Between Public Sector and Nonprofit Sector Managers
Examining Project-Based Governance of Higher Vocational Education in China
Understanding Employee Motivation to Innovate
Exploring Variations in Contracting for Services Among American Local Governments
Getting What You Ask For
Closer Than “Arms Length”
Further Understanding Accountability in Public Organizations
Understanding Contracting Performance
Introduction to the symposium
Explaining state differences in firearm legislation
Re‐Bureaucratizing Welfare Administration
Exploring and Explaining Contracting Out
Agency Theory and Beyond
Predicting Public Sector Accountability
Local institutions and public service outsourcing
Using Employee Empowerment to Encourage Innovative Behavior in the Public Sector
Privatizing the Welfare State
Theory of the firm
The Fundamental Institutions of Capitalism
"Character Talk" and Public Policy
The Nature of the Firm
The Distributional Impacts of Privatization in National Water-Quality Policy
Early Findings About the Newest New Federalism for Welfare
"The Science of "Muddling Through
Exploring the Limits of Privatization
The New Economics of Organization
Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy
Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements
| Obras citantes distintas | 32 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,45 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 32 |