The Logic of Institutional Interdependency

The Case of Day Laborer Policy in Suburbia

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6404765
AutoresLorrie Frasure (University of California, Los Angeles), Lorrie A Frasure (University of California, Los Angeles), Michael Jones-Correa (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY), Michael Jones‐correa (0000-0002-8596-9341, Cornell University)
Ano2010
Volume45
Fascículo4
Páginas451-482
Data de publicação2010-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoUrban Affairs Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1078-0874 • E-ISSN: 1552-8332
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1078087409355640
OpenAlexW2010691280
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas27
Referências citadas32

This article challenges public choice and regime theory interpretations of constraints on local politics, developing instead the institutional logic behind coalitions of local institutional actors designing redistributive policies addressing immigrant newcomers in increasingly diverse suburban jurisdictions. Employing qualitative data from a data set consisting of over 100 in-depth interviews among state and local elected and appointed officials, and community-based leaders in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, the authors find that elected officials, bureaucrats, and nonprofits partner to gain additional leverage to overcome suburban NIMBY problems such as those associated with day labor workers.These partnerships develop for at least three reasons: (1) they give community-based organizations (CBOs) access to resources available in the public sector; (2) for public agencies, these alliances lower the transaction costs associated with overcoming language and cultural barriers between newcomers and existing residents; and (3) these partnerships allow local bureaucrats to minimize outlays of their scarce resources to deal with the problems associated with the demographic shifts taking place in suburbia by essentially outsourcing much of the effort to nonprofit organizations while still allowing local bureaucrats and the elected officials who control their budgets to take credit for the programs these organizations initiate, maintain, and staff

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