Institutional Choice and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Germany

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6406486
AutoresMarian Döhler (0000-0001-8421-9103, autor correspondente)
Ano2002
Volume25
Fascículo1
Páginas101-124
Data de publicação2002-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoWest European Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0140-2382 • E-ISSN: 1743-9655
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/713601587
OpenAlexW2143911676
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas37
Referências citadas13

Although the delegation of government functions to non-majoritarian bodies such as independent agencies has accelerated throughout the OECD, Germany has followed a different path so far. In particular, administrative agencies have only rarely been granted autonomy from direct political control. The main argument is that a genetic code, inherent to the system of government institutions, has routinely auto-piloted choices that involved the design and control of agencies away from principal-agent-like considerations. The elements of this genetic code are outlined and the likelihood of their future persistence is assessed. Even if the pressure to create new agencies at arms length from government has increased, there are still strong incentives to keep them in a subordinate position." (author's abstract

Argument (complex analysis · Autonomy · Bureaucracy · Control (management · Corporate governance · Delegation · Economics · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Law and economics · Management · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Principal (computer security · Principal–agent problem · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration