Treaty withdrawal and institutional regression

What role for the democratic underlabourer

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6436293
AutoresMarkus Patberg (0000-0002-2300-7657, Universität Hamburg, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume21
Fascículo2
Páginas252-267
Data de publicação2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of International Political Theory (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1755-0882 • E-ISSN: 1755-1722
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/17550882251351919
OpenAlexW4411638815
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas44

The international order is increasingly characterised by withdrawals from international treaties. Member states renounce multilateral agreements and declare exit from international institutions. These withdrawals are often seen as a threat to normative achievements. And indeed, exit can create significant costs – for example, deprive individuals of certain rights, or do away with legitimate decision procedures. In this article, I address the methodological question of how political theory can determine whether and to what extent exit amounts to institutional regression. Focusing on the example of the European Union, I argue that the key issue is how to deal with the fact of essentially contested progress. Using elements of political realism to modify Habermas’s method of rational reconstruction, I explain how political theorists who conceive of themselves as democratic underlabourers can draw on the political views of citizens in charting a path to legitimate forms of exit

Democracy · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Treaty · European Union Policy and Governance · International Development and Aid · International Law and Aviation · Law · Public Administration