Legitimacy without Liberalism

A Defense of Max Weber’s Standard of Political Legitimacy

Dados Bibliográficos

ID7095889
AutoresAmanda R Greene (0000-0002-7257-4308, University College London London , Great Britain, autor correspondente)
Ano2017
Volume39
Fascículo2
Páginas295-324
Data de publicação2017-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAnalyse & Kritik (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0171-5860 • E-ISSN: 2365-9858
EditoraDe Gruyter (PUBLISHER • DE)
DOI10.1515/auk-2017-0017
OpenAlexW2767029414
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas19
Referências citadas3

In this paper I defend Max Weber's concept of political legitimacy as a standard for the moral evaluation of states. On this view, a state is legitimate when its subjects regard it as having a valid claim to exercise power and authority. Weber’s analysis of legitimacy is often assumed to be merely descriptive, but I argue that Weberian legitimacy has moral significance because it indicates that political stability has been secured on the basis of civic alignment. Stability on this basis enables all the goods of peaceful cooperation with minimal state violence and intimidation, thereby guarding against alienation and tyranny. Furthermore, I argue, since Weberian legitimacy is empirically measurable in terms that avoid controversial value judgments, its adoption would bridge a longstanding divide between philosophers and social scientists

Alienation · Epistemology · Intimidation · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Liberalism · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · State (computer science · Value (mathematics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory