Idealism and the Sociology of Knowledge

Dados Bibliográficos

ID7102478
AutoresDavid Bloor (University of Edinburgh, autor correspondente)
Ano1996
Volume26
Fascículo4
Páginas839-856
Data de publicação1996-11-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSocial Studies of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0306-3127 • E-ISSN: 1460-3659
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/030631296026004005
OpenAlexW2118688934
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas28
Referências citadas1

The sociology of scientific knowledge is an empirical discipline, but occasionally it can be fruitful to reflect on its methodological basis. Critics have sometimes claimed that it is committed to a form of `idealism' — that is, to discounting or playing down the input of the material world. This arises because sociologists often sum up their conclusions by saying that `knowledge is a social institution', or that `concepts are institutions'. If we think of social institutions according to the self-referential or performative model outlined by Barry Barnes, this may at first seem to reinforce and justify the charge of idealism. The main argument of this Comment is to show that while an `idealist' account of institutions is correct, the conclusion alleged by the critics does not follow. A secondary purpose is to compare Barnes' account of institutions with recent work by John Searle, and to show the significance of their different underlying assumptions about the nature of meaning

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Idealism · Institution · Meaning (existential · Performative utterance · Social science · Sociology · Sociology of knowledge · Sociology of scientific knowledge · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Philosophy