National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of Federalism

Scholars have challenged the notion of “political safeguards of federalism” in a large and well-developed body of work on the use of coercive policy tools by the federal government. This study suggests, however, that there may be some utility in re-examining the political factors that help to constrain the growth of national power. Specifically, it argues that the need to win votes from subnational constituencies makes national lawmakers less supportive of mandates, preemptions, and tax sanctions during election cycles and, thus, provides an intermittent safeguard of state authority. It tests and finds evidence for hypotheses related to that general argument in analyses of the passage of coercive federalist policies over the last thirty years

Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Federalism · Federalist · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sanctions · State (computer science · Work (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Political Systems and Governance · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Law · Public Administration

• The Federal Design Dilemma

  Philip Rocco•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2017

  Incluir item

• The Strategic Use of Congressional Intergovernmental Delegation

  Pamela J Clouser Mccann•The Journal of Politics•2015

  Incluir item

• Ideological Change in the U. S. Senate

  Open Access•Richard C Elling•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1982

  Incluir item

• Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism

  John Dinan•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2004

  Incluir item

• Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections

  Stephen Ansolabehere, Jane Mcintosh Snyder et al.•American Journal of Political…•2001

  Incluir item

• Do Parties Make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections

  Paul S Herrnson•The Journal of Politics•1986

  Incluir item

• Federalism and Competing Values In The Reagan Administration

  Timothy J Conlan•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1986

  Incluir item

• Deficits and Devolution in the 104th Congress

  R K Weaver•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1996

  Incluir item

• Devolution

  Richard L Cole, Rodney V Hissong et al.•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1999

  Incluir item

• Public Opinion and American Federalism

  Richard L Cole, John Kincaid•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2000

  Incluir item

• Supervised Devolution

  Jocelyn Elise Crowley•Publius The Journal of Federalism•2000

  Incluir item

• The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption

  Dai O’brien•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1993

  Incluir item

• Federalism in the 101st Congress

  Michael R Malaby, Douglas Webber et al.•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1991

  Incluir item

• Severing the Electoral Connection

  Lawrence S Rothenberg, Mitchell S Sanders•American Journal of Political…•2000

  Incluir item

• How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties

  Dennis Chong•American Journal of Political…•1993

  Incluir item

• Setting the Terms of Relief

  Joe So, Joe Soss et al.•American Journal of Political…•2001

  Incluir item

• Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections

  Open Access•Gerald C Wright, Gerald Wright et al.•American Political Science Review•1986

  Incluir item

• Out of Step, Out of Office

  Open Access•Brandice Canes-Wrone, D Brady et al.•American Political Science Review•2002

  Incluir item