Anthropological Materials in the Making of Michael Polanyi’s Metascience

Anthropological discussions were important for Michael Polanyi in the middle phase of his intellectual career, in which he articulated in some detail his understanding of science, culture and society. This middle period commenced with his 1946 Riddell Memorial Lectures at Durham University in early 1946, published as Science, Faith and Society later that year, and extended through the publication of Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy in 1958, based on Polanyi's 1951 and 1952 Gifford Lectures (Scott and Moleski 2005, p. 203ff.). The Riddell Lectures gave Polanyi's most robust working out of his constructive theory of science to date, although some of the ideas developed in Science, Faith and Society can also be found in writing done a few years before his Riddell Lectures. Polanyi explained in his 1964 "Background and Prospect," a retrospective introduction to a new edition of Science, Faith and Society, that the book had been catalyzed by the need to answer fundamental questions about the nature and justification of science raised by Marxist theory and, in the thirties and early 1940s, the Marxist-influenced "planned science" movement in the UK. Such questions concerned not only matters about the organization of science but what Polanyi ([1946] 1964, p. 17) called the Marxist-Leninist denial of "the intrinsic creative powers of thought." His critique of "planned science" and his rejection of the Marxist perspective on knowledge and applied science have been well covered in the scholarly literature. This article takes a different tack and focuses on Polanyi's developing interest in anthropology in his middle period. We document Polanyi's growing familiarity with anthropological literature and show that this serves as one of the important resources from which he constructed his own account of science and society.1 Some passages in Science, Faith and Society suggest that by 1946 Polanyi already was interested in anthropology, and the evidence of this interest becomes clearer in the years soon after 1946. We argue that Polanyi's increasing interest in and exploration of anthropological work—particularly that of Lucian Lévy-Bruhl and Edward Evans-Pritchard—helped Polanyi (1) formulate his criticisms of contemporary accounts of science, and (2) develop what he came to call his "fiduciary philosophy," the constructive "post-critical philosophy" he articulated in his middle period as an alternative to the modern critical tradition in philosophy. Polanyi's "fiduciary philosophy" affirms the pervasiveness and importance of belief and commitment in scientific and cultural practices.2 Polanyi used what he learned from Evans-Pritchard and other anthropologists to help articulate his "fiduciary" account, and to highlight differences between his view of science and Karl Popper's falsificationism which Polanyi regarded as the current popular embodiment of the critical tradition in philosophy.The earliest evidence of Polanyi taking a direct interest in anthropological literature is a two-page set of quotations extracted from Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), dated 29 October 1942.3 The quotations concern Malinowski's thinking about laws and sanctions in Melanesian society, a topic that is only indirectly related to the later development of Polanyi's "fiduciary philosophy." His interest in Malinowski was loosely related to matters discussed in an important 1941 article (Polanyi 1941) outlining the foundations of a stable but dynamic social order in which science as well as the legal system, the economy and other cultural practices could flourish. In the early 1940s Polanyi was particularly interested in the foundations of legal systems, and this led him to Malinowski.4Not long after his reading of Malinowski, Polanyi came to be affiliated with J. H. Oldham and his circle of intellectual friends where there was a lively interest in reform of the social order as well as appreciation for anthropological literature. In November 1943, Oldham, an influential religious intellectual and ecumenical Christian activist who convened the British discussion group called the Moot, wrote a letter introducing himself to Polanyi.5,6 Oldham requested Polanyi's permission to republish excerpts from his recent essay "The English and the Continent" (1943) as a "Christian News Letter" Supplement (a widely circulated publication that Oldham and others affiliated with the Moot published). Polanyi's historically oriented essay, which caught the attention of several Moot members, praised the English reliance on traditional practices and gradual reform through religious ideas rather than Enlightenment philosophy and criticized the Continent for following the opposite course for social reform.On May 2, 1944, Oldham invited Polanyi to participate in a meeting of the Moot on June 23–25, 1944.7 At a second Moot meeting Polanyi attended in December 1944, he, along with Karl Mannheim, was invited to respond to a paper by T. S. Eliot on the role of the "clerisy" in society. Polanyi's short written comment discussed the important function of tradition in the scientific community (Jacobs and Mullins 2006). Polanyi participated in meetings of the Moot and later Moot-like intellectual discussion groups, convened by Oldham, from 1944 until about 1960. He acknowledged that only his experience as a research scientist was more important than Oldham and his circle in the development of his ideas (Gelwick 1965, p. 11n8). Oldham became a close friend of Polanyi who made reading suggestions for Polanyi and also read and criticized many of the things Polanyi wrote.8 By the late 1940s, he often made Polanyi's essays and books the topic treated in sessions of his discussion groups (Clements 2009, p. 17, cf. Clements 1999, p. 462).Oldham took a keen interest in the findings of British anthropologists, supporting what Jack Goody (1995, pp. 17, 18–9) describes as "the acquisition and diffusion of scientific knowledge (in the widest sense) about Africa with a view to social amelioration." On friendly terms with Bronislaw Malinowski and other anthropologists, Oldham was the key figure who helped lay the foundations of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures in 1926 and, serving as its administrative director, he gained extensive knowledge about African anthropological research from the 1920s (Bennett 1960; Goody 1995, p. 17–21). Polanyi's involvement with Oldham and his circle, beginning in 1944, brought him into contact with a remarkably literate intellectual network that possibly encouraged Polanyi in the late 1940s to explore anthropological literature more fully.No anthropological literature or anthropologists' names are cited in Science, Faith and Society, but it seems likely that Polanyi's way of setting up his discussion was directly or indirectly informed by his acquaintance with anthropological sources. The second section of the opening chapter "Science and Reality" focuses on generalizations that seem obvious to Western people (e.g., that all human beings die), but Polanyi ([1946] 1964, p.15) argued this only shows Westerns are inclined to regard their own "particular convictions as inescapable." He went on to discuss the "rival claims of the magical and the naturalistic interpretations of events" and noted a "similar competitive conflict" between the medieval Christian and the scientific outlooks ([1946] 1964, pp.15–6). The matter of competing interpretations of the world—science, magic, astrology, mythology, occultism and religion—Polanyi came back to repeatedly in Science, Faith and Society.9 Each such interpretation is a worldview incorporated in language with distinctive "premises" (presuppositions). Children acquire their worldview as they learn their society's language:The children of primitive natives whose parents are inveterately confirmed in their magical interpretation of things, can be brought up without difficulty to a naturalistic view of nature...The reverse would no doubt be just as easy to achieve; and Europeans brought up to believe in an elaborate system of magic could be made as impervious to science as are primitive natives to-day. The naturalistic view held by scientists as by other modern men to-day has its origin in their primary education. (Polanyi [1946] 1964, p. 42)According to Science, Faith and Society (Polanyi [1946] 1964, p. 66), disagreements within a worldview over, for example, the truth of scientific theories or the validity of different interpretations of the Bible, "can usually be brought to a definite test" by their "respective professional opinions" (a view Polanyi rescinded by 1958 in Personal Knowledge), whereas a religious outlook may have no test implications in common "with a naturalistic view" that could be used for determining which is the better account. Polanyi contrasted the magical and naturalistic interpretations of experience to illustrate the extent to which worldviews diverge. He observed how "primitive peoples" deny the idea of death as naturally caused,their general belief [being] that events which are harmful to man are never natural, but always the outcome of magic wrought by some malevolent person. In this magical interpretation of experience we see some causes which to us are massive and plain (such as a stone smashing a man's skull) regarded as incidental or even irrelevant to the event, while certain remote incidents (like the passing overhead of a rare bird) which to us appear to have no conceivable bearing on it are seized upon as its effective causes. (Polanyi [1946] 1964, p. 25)Factual arguments cannot logically dictate that people prefer naturalism to the magical or any other worldview. Primitive peoples, Polanyi explained ([1946] 1964, p. 25), find their magical beliefs fully agreeing with their everyday experience, and Europeans' use of their experience to criticize magic does nothing to dint the confidence of followers of magic. Our naturalistic "terms of interpretation" and experience cannot show other interpretations of "external reality" to be unsatisfactory (Polanyi [1946] 1964, p. 25). Believers in the magical interpretation of things are as unimpressed with our naturalistic-scientific worldview as we are with their interpretation. Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande, rated by Werbner (2015, p. 28, quoting Beidelman 1974, p. 163) as "the greatest single monograph ever written on an African people and one of the truly great books in anthropology," is replete with contrasts of naturalistic-scientific and magical worldviews (see the discussion below of Polanyi's later citations of this material), suggesting the possibility that, directly or indirectly, perhaps it influenced Polanyi's thinking in Science, Faith and Society.In his 1946 book, Polanyi used the anthropological case of magic in relation to the naturalistic-scientific interpretation of the world to raise an epistemological question that has come to attract a good deal of attention in anthropology and the philosophy of science and social science since the 1960s. If so-called simple fact and logic cannot prove the naturalistic-scientific worldview true nor show it to be better than other worldviews, on what basis is a scientist to prefer his or her perspective as more deserving of credence than that of believers in magic? In Science, Faith and Society, Polanyi indicated the scientist's "competent" decision in favor of science is based on his or her trained intuitions, conscience, and mental needs, as well as the tradition of science and the premises it embodies ([1946] 1964, pp. 25ff., 61, 66ff., 71ff., 82–3). Citing St. Augustine's writing, Polanyi commented on the "mental satisfaction" with which worldviews provide their adherents ([1946] 1964, pp. 66–7), and pointed out that when supporters of one worldview challenge another,They will try to expose the general poverty of their opponent's position and to stimulate interest for their own richer perspectives; trusting that once an opponent has caught a glimpse of these, he cannot fail to sense a new mental satisfaction, which will attract him further and finally draw him over to its own grounds.The process of choosing between positions based on different sets of premises is thus more a matter of intuition and finally conscience, than is a decision between different interpretations based on the same or closely similar sets of premises. It is a judgement of the kind involved in scientific discovery. (Polanyi [1946] 1964, p. 67)In May 1947, Polanyi received an invitation from Sir William Hamilton, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Aberdeen, to give the Gifford Lectures for 1949–1950. As his biographers suggest, Polanyi recognized this invitation as an "opportunity for his wider piece of work in philosophy" (Scott and Moleski 2005, p. 204). This "wider piece of work" grew out of Polanyi's Riddell Lectures and other writing from the middle and late 1940s. In his Gifford Lectures, Polanyi aimed to articulate more fully his growing criticisms of certain Enlightenment ideas that he believed have misrepresented science and eventually promoted nihilism, violence, and totalitarianism in contemporary culture. Polanyi also aimed to set forth his own alternative constructive philosophical perspective that drew on significantly reformed Enlightenment ideas. This alternative philosophical account, which Polanyi first termed in his Gifford Lectures a "fiduciary philosophy" and "post-critical philosophy," emphasizes the pervasiveness and importance of belief and commitment. In his sixth 1951 lecture, "Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy" Polanyi contends, "The rehabilitation of overt belief ... may restore the balance between observation and moral judgment in...human affairs" allowing human beings "to envisage without self contradiction the social rootedness and social responsibility of our beliefs concerning man and society." (1951)10 "Fiduciarism," Polanyi argues "must learn to express belief in a way which will countenance beliefs as belief without reducing their content or the act of affirming them to the status of mere subjectivity." Due to a variety of problems, including the difficulties of working out details of his "fiduciary philosophy," Polanyi failed to have his Gifford Lectures ready for delivery in 1949–50 and he delayed them several times until 1951 (the first series) and 1952 (the second series).11In the period in which he was preparing the lectures, Polanyi excerpted passages he found interesting in the writings of the French philosopher-anthropologist Lévy-Bruhl. There are five different sets of notes dated February 1948 to 1951 (not all notes are dated) from three different Lévy-Bruhl books.12 The typed excerpts, dated February 1948, are from four pages (16, 19, 69 and 93) of Lévy-Bruhl's The "Soul" of the Primitive (1928), including Lévy-Bruhl's observation (p. 16) that the "primitive," like the child, distinguishes neither himself nor others "from the beings and objects of the world around."Polanyi prepared a second seven-page set of excerpts, dated 31 January 1949, of material from this same Lévy-Bruhl book.13 A review of some of these excerpts reflects the tendency of Polanyi's interests. One excerpt relates a story about magic that Lévy-Bruhl took from L. Magyar; Polanyi included it in an article of 1952 discussed below (1928, pp. 44–5). The excerpt from page 62 Polanyi titled "Argument on Animism"; it includes a quotation from a text of 1634: "Whenever I laughed at them and told them that the beavers did not know what happened to their bones they used to say: 'You don't know how to trap beavers, and yet want to tell us about them'." From page 110, Polanyi took a passage:Hence arise two causes of error, both equally difficult to avoid: either we have to be satisfied with confused and contradictory notions (which are not so for primitive mentality), and by this apparent fidelity give a false idea of its representations—or else we must endow it with a clarity and inner coherence of which it feels no need, and thus betray it in another way.Another page of notes, dated simply as 1949, consists of excerpts from four pages (57, 92, and 111–12) of Lévy-Bruhl's 1936 book, Primitives and the Supernatural. From page 57, (Chapter: Good and Bad Luck), Polanyi's quotation includedin their eyes the supernatural world is inextricably bound up with nature, and as a consequence the invisible powers intervene at all times in what we call the natural course of events. Hence anything unfortunate, or merely unusual, that may happen is never perceived solely as an event, for they at once interpret it as a manifestation of these powers.On a page of notes dated 1951, Polanyi excerpted material from pages 93, 94, and 105 of The Soul of the Primitive, referring at the top left corner "(To Gifford III. p.7)." Polanyi's Series I, Gifford Lecture 3, provides a brief discussion of the identification of "primitive individuals" with the group, in relation to fratricide and parricide, and has a citation of Levy Bruhl's discussion on page 105.14Finally, there is an undated page of notes with a short extract from another of Lévy-Bruhl's works, How Natives Think (1910). The text quoted reads, "Page 73: 'To natives,' says Pechuël-Loesche [333], 'there is no such thing as chance. Occurrences which are close together in point of time, even if widely removed in space, readily appear to them to be linked by a causal relation'." In sum, the several Lévy-Bruhl excerpts he carefully recorded make clear Polanyi's interest in the disjunction between Western naturalistic thought and the worldview of the "primitive."Further evidence of Polanyi's deepening interest in anthropology during the period he was preparing his Gifford Lecture is afforded by two letters Polanyi wrote to his friend Edward Shils. In March of 1948, Polanyi exchanged his chair in chemistry for an appointment as Professor of Social Studies (Scott and Moleski 2005, p. 204). After the exchange, he apparently acquired some new duties concerned with enhancing Manchester University programs in social science. On 16 November 1948, he wrote to Shils at The London School of Economics for "advice in filling our Simon Visiting Professorships," noting the university sought "eminent men in the field of Social Sciences."15 Polanyi was "particularly keen on getting someone to represent social anthropology, which is not very actively pursued at the moment in this country." He also asked "to consult" Shils "about the filling of a Readership in social anthropology which we are going to establish here." Shils replied to Polanyi on 24 November 194816, naming anthropologists he considered "to be the best that the United States can offer": Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, Clyde Kluckhohn and Margaret Mead. In a letter of 18 February 1949, Polanyi asked Shils to consider moving from his primary domicile, The University of Chicago, to fill the Reader position at Manchester as a stepping stone to a chair in sociology that "We are trying to establish ... here."17In 1949, Max Gluckman (1972, p. x) was appointed the inaugural professor of Social Anthropology at Manchester, coming from Oxford where he had been a colleague of Evans-Pritchard. Gluckman recalled giving a public lecture, "Social beliefs and individual thinking in primitive society," to the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society in 1949 (1972, p. xi). Largely based on Evans-Pritchard's book on the Azande, Gluckman's lecture added illustrations from his own research and some of his own particular emphases. "The strength of Evans-Pritchard's insight into the specific logic of Azande beliefs in witchcraft and magic, and into the relation between this logic and both empirical reality and social morality, made an immediate impression on all my colleagues" at Manchester, he noted (1972, p. xi).In his public lecture, Gluckman generalized that all people are shaped by their society's culture, including perceptions and their description, emotional responses to, and complex ideas concerning, social relations, "ideas of the causes of events," etc. (1949–50, p. 75). He focused on a specific aspect of Evans-Pritchard's work, "the form which skepticism takes in primitive society" (1949–50, p. 73). For example, when a member of a primitive society believes himself to be wrongly accused of witchcraft, he expresses his "doubts in the dogma of the system," drawing from other facets of it, confirming "his own acceptance of the system as a whole" (1949–50, p. 86). "Africans reason quite logically and sensibly, and show psychological insight as penetrating as our own" (1949–50, p. 88).Gluckman was sure witchcraft rests on unsound "premises," rejecting its view "that misfortunes are caused by witchcraft or sorcery," but he doubted whether the belief system could be disproven (1949–50, p. 89). The various elements of Azande witchcraft theory reinforce one another. He (1949–50, p. 90) recalled that Evans-Pritchard regarded "faith and skepticism" as elements of the tradition of Azande witchcraft: "Skepticism explains failures of witch-doctors, and being directed towards particular witch doctors even tends to support faith in others" (1949–50, p. 90, quoting Evans-Pritchard 1937, page uncited by Gluckman). Again,in this web of belief every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of its meshes because this is the only world he knows. The web is not an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and he cannot think that his thought is wrong. Nevertheless, his beliefs are not absolutely set but are variable and fluctuating to allow for different situations and to permit empirical observation and even doubts. (Gluckman 1949–50, p. 90; Evans-Pritchard 1937, page uncited by Gluckman).Evans-Pritchard referred to these as "secondary elaborations of belief. Failures can be interpreted within the system by invoking other beliefs" (1949–50, p. 91, Evans-Pritchard, 1937, page uncited by Gluckman).Apparent echoes of Evans-Pritchard in Science, Faith and Society notwithstanding, Gluckman (1972, pp. xii–xv) seemed to think Polanyi had not read Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande before he gave his 1949 inaugural lecture. He described Evans-Pritchard's book as exerting a "concentrated influence" on Polanyi and other Manchester colleagues:The strength of Evans-Pritchard's insight into the specific logic of Azande beliefs in witchcraft and magic, and into the relation between this logic and both empirical reality and social morality, made an immediate impression on all my colleagues. It led Professors Ely Devons [Economics], Dorothy Emmet [Philosophy], Bill Mackenzie [Politics], and Michael Polanyi [Social Studies] to read his great book, to extend their reading in the subject, and to attend seminars in our subject, as we attended seminars in theirs. (Gluckman 1972, p. xi; emphasis added)Gluckman's reflections on his 1949 public lecture, its reception and stimulation of study at Manchester of Evans-Pritchard's writing confirm that by 1949 at the latest Polanyi had become deeply interested in Evans-Pritchard's work. There is a two-page set of extracts in archival Polanyi materials, dated February, 1950, from Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande, recording eight passages, most of them lengthy.18 These apparently helped Polanyi prepare the essay "Scientific Beliefs."19"Scientific Beliefs" is the first publication of Polanyi (1950, pp. 32–3, 37) that actually cites anthropologists. He agreed with Lévy-Bruhl's supposition that we members of modern society "acquire a clear subject-object relationship and the idea of natural causes, a corollary to which is the conception of accident," adding "Lévy-Bruhl has shown that this supposition forms the logical basis of the naturalistic outlook, according to which events affecting human fate may be purely accidental, i.e., entirely meaningless" (1950, p. 32).20In its summary of his understanding of Azande culture, "Scientific Beliefs" shows Polanyi's debt to Evans-Pritchard extends well beyond merely providing magic as an illustrative example of a worldview. Evans-Pritchard provided Polanyi with significant epistemological insight as well. "Scientific Beliefs" argues against what Polanyi held to be a widespread misconception of science as "demonstrable" and free from "doubtful beliefs" (1950, p. 27). In Polanyi's alternative depiction, science includes deep-seated "beliefs" ("fiducial elements"). The object of his article was toreplace the positivistic model by a more adequate reference to science. We must openly declare the beliefs which we hold about the nature of things, which guide our pursuit of science. We must admit that these beliefs are acquired by us uncritically in the course of our early education or subsequent apprenticeship to science and that no succeeding critical examination of these basic beliefs can ever eliminate all fiducial elements of our thinking. (Polanyi 1950, p. 30)21By the time he published "Scientific Beliefs," Polanyi was at work piecing together his "fiduciary philosophy," emphasizing "personal knowledge" with its feature of commitment made with "universal intent" (1950, p. 33).A number of the main ideas in "Scientific Beliefs," Polanyi directly or indirectly drew from Evans-Pritchard's text, and most of these ideas resonate with Gluckman's comments in his lecture of 1949.(i) The law-like statements of science are unverifiable, and often, scientific theories cannot "be strictly contradicted by experience," being expandableThere is no rule instructing scientists on whether to reject their hypothesis or to reject the observations contradicting it.(ii) The "most general belief" of science—the "naturalistic view of the universe"—guides the scientist in rejecting observations that seem to confirm "the reliability of predictions from horoscopes, for the potency of magic or the powers of witchcraft" (1950, p. 31).(iii) The naturalistic outlook is acquired in the course of learning to speak the mother tongue by "uncritically absorbing the idiom of our elders." We are "born into" both our society's language and its beliefs about the world. Society is "constituted by" its members' shared commitment to naturalistic beliefs. Parallel points apply to people who have been raised in a culture of "magic, witchcraft, and oracles" (1950, p. 32).(iv) Evidence is only evidence within a cultural framework. What we count as evidence exposing the "worthlessness of their oracles" believers in oracles would brush aside as inconsequential. Polanyi quoted Evans-Pritchard's view that Azande observations of the activities of their oracles(v) Systems of belief are uncriticizable from within. Evans-Pritchard opined that the Azande "reason excellently in the idioms of their beliefs, but they cannot reason outside, or against, their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to express their thoughts" (Polanyi 1950, p. 32, quoting Evans-Pritchard 1937, p. 338).(vi) The Azande may doubt some details of their system but they "express their dissent in alternative Zande beliefs," effectively reinforcing Zande beliefs and their commitment to them. Likewise, with the naturalistic-scientific worldview, but "this is not to say our beliefs are immutable," rather they undergo constant remoulding "in the course of being applied to new objects" (Polanyi 1950, p. 33).By making extensive use of Lévy-Bruhl and Evans-Pritchard, Polanyi outlined, in "Scientific Beliefs," a framework view of knowledge, including scientific knowledge. Each cognitive framework, he emphasized, is remarkably stable, but not impervious to change. He did not rule out the possibility of people relinquishing their framework, noting that our beliefs may be "shake[n]" by others, but only if our beliefs "are already losing ground for other reasons" (Polanyi 1950, p. 33). Polanyi regarded shifting a deep-seated coherent system of beliefs as akin to learning a new language through which to see and understand the world. Although his article outlined this perspective concerning the character of "scientific beliefs," Polanyi also affirmed, here and in other writing, that scientists making contact with reality and truth is a standard or transcendent ideal that scientists must serve. He also affirmed that scientific beliefs rooted in a rational and naturalistic Western cultural framework are superior to beliefs rooted in other frameworks like that of the Azande; nevertheless, he recognized there is growth and change in scientific beliefs over time. For some of his contemporaries, the affirmations as well as the tensions among different affirmations in Polanyi's heterodox views pointed in the direction of the relativity of truth.In May and June of 1951, Polanyi delivered the ten lectures of his Series I Gifford Lectures and followed in November 1952 with ten additional Series II lectures. The general title for these lectures was "Commitment: In Quest of a Post-Critical Philosophy." Polanyi's "post-critical" philosophy emphasized commitment and belief as central to knowledge in a way that the modern turn initiated by Descartes and variously elaborated by his modern philosophical successors had not done. Descartes had led modern thought to value critical doubt, method, and clear and distinct explicit ideas. Polanyi's "post-critical" philosophy aimed searchingly to criticize the critical tradition and replace it with a "fiduciary philosophy," which focused on "personal knowledge," as the title of his 1958 book based on his Gifford Lectures emphasizes.Part of Polanyi's program in the final lectures of Series I was to examine the generally accepted modern philosophical notion that doubt is heuristic. He called into question assumptions about the importance of doubt, which he held to broadly underlay the modern ethos and much mode

Constructive · Denial · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice

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