Naturalizing Intentionality

Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories

Dados Bibliográficos

ID7956922
AutoresAngela Mendelovici (0000-0002-5496-0141, Western University, autor correspondente), David Bourget (0000-0003-0155-9634, Western University, autor correspondente)
Ano2014
Volume9
Fascículo5
Páginas325-337
Data de publicação2014-05-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12123
OpenAlexW1921980821
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas12
Referências citadas70

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Intentionality · Naturalism · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment