Opting for the Best
Oughts and Options
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8069734 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Douglas W Portmore (0000-0001-6180-457X, Arizona State University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2019 |
| Páginas | 336 |
| Data de publicação | 2019-07-17 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | BOOK |
| Periódico | Opting for the Best (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Editora | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780190945350.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4232073446 |
| Open Library | OL28938696M |
| ISBN | 9780190945350 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 37 |
| Referências citadas | 58 |
The book concerns what is, perhaps, the least controversial normative principle concerning action: you ought to perform your best option—best, that is, in terms of whatever ultimately matters. The book sets aside the question of what ultimately matters so as to focus on the following questions. What are our options? Which options do we assess directly in terms of their own goodness and which do we assess in terms of the goodness of the more encompassing options of which they’re a proper part? What do we hold fixed when assessing how good an option is? Do we, for instance, hold fixed the agent’s present beliefs, desires, and intentions? And do we hold fixed the agent’s predictable future misbehavior? The book argues that addressing these sorts of questions is the key to solving certain puzzles concerning what we ought to do, including those involving supererogation, indeterminate outcomes, overdetermined outcomes, and predictable future misbehavior. One of the book’s more controversial theses is that we have obligations not only to voluntarily perform certain actions, but also to nonvoluntarily form certain reasons-responsive attitudes (e.g., desires, beliefs, and intentions). This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not only on which acts the agent will simultaneously and subsequently be performing but also on which attitudes she will simultaneously and subsequently be forming
Economics · Keynesian economics · Opting out · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Choice (Psychology) · conduct of life · Decision making · Ethics · Values
Dilemmas, Teleology, and Incomparable Value
Enticing Epistemic Reasons
A Holist Balance Scale
Probabilism
Forgiveness, Repentance, and Diachronic Blameworthiness
Deserving to Suffer
Sweatshops and Free Action
The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement
Resolving Mill’s Absolutism Problem
Consequentialism Without Contradiction
Non-ideal prescriptions for the morally uncertain
How to be reasonable about the meaning of ‘ought’
Consequentialism and our best selves
Supererogation and conditional obligation
Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding
Too far beyond the call of duty
Incommensurability and hardness
Infinite options, intransitive value, and supererogation
Binary act consequentialism
Three paradoxes of supererogation
Self‐prediction in practical reasoning
The dual scale model of weighing reasons
The Source of Responsibility
Supererogation and Optimisation
Conditional analyses of options for action
All Reasons Are Fundamentally for Attitudes
Exploitation and effective altruism
Consequences of comparability
Three Forms of Actualist Direct Consequentialism
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk
When reasons run out
Question-centred consequentialism
Knowledge of Objective ‘Oughts’
Desert of blame
Doing your part
Embracing self‐defeat in normative theory
Aesthetic obligations
Doing the Best One Can
Reasons
Internal and external reasons
‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons
The Moralistic Fallacy
Things That Make Things Reasonable
A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness
Maximalism and Moral Harmony
Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary
Exercising Doxastic Freedom
Ought' Conversationally Implies `Can
Actions That We Ought, But Can't
The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It
Frankfurt on the principle of alternate possibilities
Transmission Failures
Consequentialism and History
Instrumental Reasons
The Normativity of Rationality
Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason
Human Welfare and Moral Worth
Ordering Supervaluationism, Counterpart Theory, and Ersatz Fundamentality
Engaging Reason
Reflection and Responsibility
Fittingness
Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella
A New Argument for Evidentialism
Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy
| Obras citantes distintas | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 6,17 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 37 |