Humean agent-neutral reasons

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8090156
AutoresDaan Evers (0000-0001-7055-930X, autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume12
Fascículo1
Páginas55-67
Data de publicação2009-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophical Explorations (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1386-9795 • E-ISSN: 1741-5918
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13869790802635614
OpenAlexW2124323923
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas6

In his recent book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons (hypotheticalism). He argues that it is compatible with ‘genuinely agent-neutral reasons’. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons (if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons

Argument (complex analysis · Epistemology · Passions · Practical reason · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Philosophy

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