An Analysis of Prudential Value
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 8090426 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Stephen Campbell (0000-0002-2328-4136, autor correspondente), Stephen M Campbell |
| Ano | 2013 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 334-354 |
| Data de publicação | 2013-07-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820812000581 |
| OpenAlex | W1965103895 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 11 |
| Referências citadas | 13 |
This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life
Appeal · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Luck · Paternalism · Pity · Political science · Position (finance · Positive economics · Selfishness · Value (mathematics · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology · Law · Philosophy · Social Psychology
Taking Utilitarianism Seriously
Against Welfare Subjectivism
Dialectics of wellness
The good life as the life in touch with the good
Happiness and desire satisfaction
The Trouble with Genuine-Attraction Desires
Death as a fact of life
Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument
The experience requirement on well-being
Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters
Well-being, part 1
| Obras citantes distintas | 11 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 11 |