Hume’s Common Sense Morality

Hume's moral theory, I shall here argue, is explicitly and in fundamental ways a common sense theory. It is widely accepted, of course, that Hume found moral distinctions to rest on sentiment, and that he found in the principle of sympathy the means by which individual sentiments come to be experienced by others. What has not received adequate attention is Hume's concern to refute moral skepticism and his explicit reliance on appeals to “common sense,” nor,so far as I know, has anyone suggested how these several features coalesce in an outlook which is appropriately designated a common sense theory. To support my claim I shall first show that Hume is not, as is widely supposed, what we would term a “subjectivist” in morals, and that in fact he means to establish, in at least two important senses of the term, the “objectivity”of morals

Common sense · Epistemology · Morality · Objectivity (philosophy · Skepticism · Subjectivism · Sympathy · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought · Philosophy · Social Psychology

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