Why Is Instrumental Rationality Rational

It is relatively common for philosophers to doubt whether we have any reason to act as morality requires. But it is very difficult to find philosophers who are willing to doubt, in a similar way, the idea that we have reason to act as instrumental rationality requires; reason, that is, to take effective steps toward attaining the ends we have accepted as our own. The inference from the fact that a certain action is an effective means of satisfying an agent's ends to the conclusion that that agent has reason to perform that action is held by almost everyone to be, as it is sometimes said, automatic: once it is determined that the action in question bears the specified relation to one's goals, nothing more needs to be shown. But fewer philosophers are willing to grant that morality possesses this sort of automatic reason-giving force. Rather, it is quite commonly held that some additional consideration needs to be cited in order to show that an agent has reason to act as she is morally required. The fact that an action is morally required, claim those who adhere to this type of position, is not enough in itself

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• Instrumental Rationality

  John Brunero•Instrumental Rationality•2020

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• Practical Rationality and Preference

  Open Access•Charles W Morris, Robert Brandom et al.•Practical Rationality and…•2001

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• Moral Luck

  Open Access•Bernard Williams•Moral Luck•1981

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• Plural and Conflicting Values

  Michael Stocker•Plural and Conflicting Values•1992

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• Engaging Reason

  Joseph Raz•Engaging Reason•2002

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