Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8092871
AutoresMarkus Kohl (0000-0001-9082-8490, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume53
Fascículo2
Páginas301-326
Data de publicação2015-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of the history of philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-5053 • E-ISSN: 1538-4586
EditoraProject MUSE (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1353/hph.2015.0034
OpenAlexW2089879057
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas11
Referências citadas16

It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy

Agency (philosophy · Autonomy · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Moral agency · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · War, Ethics, and Justification · Law · Philosophy