The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8094541
AutoresDaniel Sutherland (0000-0002-3529-6943, autor correspondente)
Ano2004
Volume34
Fascículo3
Páginas411-441
Data de publicação2004-09-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoCanadian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0045-5091 • E-ISSN: 1911-0820
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1080/00455091.2004.10716573
OpenAlexW2470891890
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas17

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all

Axiom · Critical philosophy · Epistemology · Geometry · Intuition · Linguistics · Object (grammar · Perception · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy