Givenness and Cognition

We are grateful to Stefanie Grüne and Andrew Chignell for their thoughtful commentaries on our paper. Both focus their remarks on the issue of 'givenness,' which could seem like a relatively narrow topic within the much broader subject matter of cognition that we have attempted to describe in our paper. However, we think that givenness, properly understood, plays an important role in Kant's account of cognition, since it is central to both of the conditions that Kant places on cognition (which we call the 'givenness condition' and the 'thought condition'). In particular, we maintain that givenness is an independent condition on cognition, one that has a meaning and function distinct from what it contributes to the thought condition. Full consideration of the givenness condition allows one to see more clearly how it gives expression to one of Kant's most fundamental concerns in the first Critique. For, in our view, the primary role of givenness is to help to explain how it is that representations can refer, or fail to refer, to objects in a specific, cognitively significant way, an achievement that Kant is marking with the term 'cognition.' To make good on these claims and to substantiate this picture of the broader significance of givenness within Kant's account of cognition, we address Grüne's paper first, then Chignell's

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