Sāṃkhya on the Validity (prāmāṇya) and Invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of Cognition

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8237541
AutoresOłena Łucyszyna (0000-0001-6972-649X, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume34
Páginas145-176
Data de publicação2021-01-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoActa Asiatica Varsoviensia (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0860-6102 • E-ISSN: 2449-8653
EditoraDepartment of AAV and Hemispheres, Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures, PAS (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.60018/acasva.cxdu9543
OpenAlexW4385503463
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas19

One of the well-known polemics of Indian thought, in which many darśanas participated, is concerned with the problem of the validity (prāmāṇya) and invalidity (aprāmāṇya) of cognition (jñāna). The problem has two main aspects: the origination and ascertainment of validity and invalidity. Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha and other external sources attribute to Sāṃkhya (a tradition of thought recognising the authority of the Vedas) the view that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic, and many researchers hold that this view is Sāṃkhyan. In this article, I reconstruct the Sāṃkhya view on validity and invalidity of cognition on the basis of classical and postclassical Sāṃkhya texts, that is, all extant Sāṃkhya texts from Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s Sāṃkhyakārikā to Aniruddha’s Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti. I come to the conclusion that the Sāṃkhya view is different from the view attributed to Sāṃkhya. According to Sāṃkhya texts, validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic in terms of both origination and ascertainment

Cognition · Epistemology · Extant taxon · External validity · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Mindfulness and Compassion Interventions · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology