Modus Vivendi Arrangements, Stability, and the All-Subjected Principle

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8253370
AutoresChiara Fumagalli (0000-0002-5402-162X, University of Genoa, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Fascículo2
Páginas191-210
Data de publicação2022-06-09
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoRivista Italiana di Filosofia Politica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2785-3330 • E-ISSN: 2785-4256
EditoraFirenze University Press (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.36253/rifp-1691
OpenAlexW4281685489
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas16

Despite the importance of the requirement that all parties subject to a modus vivendi accept it, the philosophical basis of the all-subjected principle has been largely neglected in the realist literature on modus vivendi arrangements as responses to disagreements on issues of common concern. In this article, I argue that the inclusion of all-subjected parties should be understood as instrumental to justifying the presupposition that enough parties will have the motivation to comply with an arrangement that they grudgingly accept as a modus vivendi. I also argue that without accepting the democratic commitments implicit in the acceptance of the standard reading of the all-subjected principle, realist modus vivendi theorists should demonstrate that all those parties who are subjected to a modus vivendi arrangement have the capacity to voice their objection and to be heard for such a claim

Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Presupposition · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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