Massively Parallel Distributed Processing and a Computationalist Foundation for Cognitive Science

My purpose in this brief paper is to consider the implications of a radically different computer architecure to some fundamental problems in the foundations of Cognitive Science. More exactly. I wish to consider the ramifications of the ‘Gödel-Minds-Machines’ controversy of the late 1960s on a dynamically changing computer architecture which, I venture to suggest, is going to revolutionize which ‘functions’ of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata. I will proceed on the presupposition that the reader is familiar with some of the fundamentals of computational theory and mathematical logic.

Cognition · Cognitive architecture · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence) · Massively parallel · Parallel computing · Presupposition · Programming language · Theory of computation · Architecture · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theoretical Computer Science

• Abstract Complexity Theory and the Mind-Machine Problem

  ALBERT E LYNGZEIDETSON, MARTIN K SOLOMON•The British Journal for the…•1994

  Incluir item

• Parallel Architectures and Mental Computation

  Andrew Wells•The British Journal for the…•1993

  Incluir item

• Social Morality and Individual Ideal

  Open Access•P F Strawson•Philosophy•1961

  Incluir item

• Human and Machine Logic

  J R Lucas•The British Journal for the…•1968

  Incluir item